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Labor Violations in Mexico: Can New 
Trade Agreements Effectuate Change? 
Nicole Downey Moss* 
Child labor and forced labor remain pervasive problems on 
Mexican farms. Millions of workers on these farms are 
forced to work and live in inhumane conditions, only to leave 
the season’s harvest just as poor as they were before. To 
date, human rights and labor treaties and agreements that 
Mexico is party to have failed to protect workers. In early 
2016, however, negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partner-
ship (“TPP”) concluded and, if ratified, the party-countries 
claim that the TPP will hold Mexico to higher standards than 
previously faced because the TPP will link labor rights with 
trade law. However, this was the hope when Mexico, Can-
ada, and the United States placed the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) into force as well. This article 
will therefore analyze whether the TPP is indeed an im-
provement on NAFTA and, if so, whether the TPP will work 
to effectively enforce Mexican labor rights. This article be-
gins with a look at the violations occurring on the farms, fol-
lowed by a summary of the international human rights laws, 
international labor laws, and international trade laws that 
Mexico is already party to. The article also includes an in-
depth summary of the labor side-agreement to NAFTA, the 
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North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation and how 
this side agreement compares to the TPP. Lastly, this article 
examines additional efforts that may be made to uphold la-
bor rights on Mexican farms, including a bottom-up ap-
proach that involves both laborers and consumers. Accord-
ingly, this article concludes that the TPP does represent a 
significant improvement on NAFTA, though it remains to be 
seen whether this improvement will itself be enough to effec-
tuate change in Mexico. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
When walking into a local supermarket and seeing a wide selec-
tion of fresh fruits and vegetables, it is nearly impossible to imagine 
what the “Made in Mexico” sticker on many of those products en-
tails. Though recent investigations have helped to increase aware-
ness, 1 the average consumer typically would not be able to tell that 
their store-bought vegetables were picked by a poor Mexican farm-
worker, who lives in a rat-infested camp, making just $8 to $12 dol-
lars a day, and being beaten if he tries to escape.2 Sifting through red 
peppers, in search of the best ones, one likewise would not be aware 
that they were picked by small children, who were pulled out of 
school and trying to harvest enough to ensure that they would not 
die of starvation.3 The United States and Mexico have recently an-
nounced collaborative plans to increase the safety of the food we 
eat.4 However, the current multilateral agreements concerning the 
labor rights of those harvesting that food do little, if anything, to 
protect the workers responsible for the production of our food. 
Mexico’s Constitution recognizes basic labor rights.5 Addition-
ally, Mexico is a party to North America Free Trade Agreement 
                                                                                                             
 1 Richard Marosi, Hardship on Mexico’s Farms, a Bounty for U.S. Tables, 
LOS ANGELES TIMES (Dec. 7, 2014), http://graphics.latimes.com/product-of-mex-
ico-camps [hereinafter Hardship on Mexico’s Farms]. 
 2 Id. (stating “[m]any farm laborers are essentially trapped for months at a 
time in rat-infested camps, often without beds and sometimes without functioning 
toilets or a reliable water supply.”). 
 3 Richard Marosi, In Mexico’s Fields, Children Toil to Harvest Crops That 
Make it to American Tables, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Dec. 14, 2014), http://graphic
s.latimes.com/product-of-mexico-children/ [hereinafter In Mexico’s Fields]. 
 4 See FDA Builds Closer Ties with Mexico, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Oct. 
16, 2014), http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm418741.ht
m. 
 5 See Constitución Politica De Los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], art. 
123, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], 05-02-1917, últimas reformas DOF 
2015 (Mex.). 
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(NAFTA), which, in part, seeks to enforce basic labor rights.6 How-
ever, the Mexican government has proven unable, or unwilling, to 
enforce the Constitution’s rights,7 and the agreements that the coun-
try is party to lack sufficient enforcement mechanisms.8 This may 
soon change, however, if the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) goes 
into effect.9 The United States government has claimed that, if this 
agreement is ratified, labor rights in Mexico, and in other party-
countries, will be revitalized.10 
The TPP is a proposed multilateral agreement between the 
United States and twelve other countries, including Mexico.11 The 
TPP requires parties to implement and enforce fundamental labor 
rights recognized by the International Labour Organization (ILO), a 
specialized agency of the United Nations that is devoted to promot-
ing labor rights.12 These rights include the elimination of forced la-
bor13 and the abolition of child labor.14 The TPP also requires parties 
                                                                                                             
 6 See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 8, 1992, 
32 I.L.M. 289 (1993). 
 7 BUREAU OF INT’L LABOR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, LIST OF GOODS 
PRODUCED BY CHILD LABOR OR FORCED LABOR 5 (Dec. 1, 2014), available at htt
p://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/pdf/TVPRA_Report2014.pdf (finding that at least 
nine products produced in Mexico were produced by child labor) [hereinafter LIST 
OF GOODS PRODUCED BY CHILD LABOR OR FORCED LABOR]. 
 8 For instance, agreements put forth by one of the most established organi-
zations for labor rights, the International Labor Organization, “has no sanctioning 
power or other means of enforcing its standards.” See Lance A. Compa, The First 
NAFTA Labor Cases: A New International Labor Rights Regime Takes Shape, 3 
U.S.-MEX. L.J. 159, 160 (1995). 
 9 See Text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, N.Z. FOREIGN AFFAIRS & 
TRADE (Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/about-us/who-we-are/trea-
ties/trans-pacific-partnership-agreement-tpp/text-of-the-trans-pacific-partnership 
[hereinafter TPP]. 
 10 Vivian Dong, Enforcing Labor Standards Under The Trans-Pacific Part-
nership, ONLABOR (Feb. 29, 2016), https://onlabor.org/2016/02/29/enforcing-la-
bor-standards-under-the-trans-pacific-partnership/ (quoting the U.S. Trade Rep-
resentative as stating the TPP has “the strongest protections for workers of any 
trade agreement in history”). 
 11 TPP: What is it and why does it matter?, BBC (Jan. 27, 2017), http://www
.bbc.com/news/business-32498715. 
 12 Trans-Pacific Partnership art.19.3(1), available at https://www.mfat.govt
.nz/assets/_securedfiles/Trans-Pacific-Partnership/Text/19.-Labour-Chapter.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 8, 2017). 
 13 Id. at art. 19.3(1)(b). 
 14 Id. at art. 19.3(1)(c). 
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to commit to have laws governing standards such as minimum wage 
and hours of work.15 In the event of a violation of a labor provision, 
the TPP includes dispute settlement procedures, including possible 
trade sanctions.16Additionally, under the TPP, the United States has 
negotiated bilateral implementation plans to ensure that specific 
countries are conforming to the agreement’s commitments.17 These 
plans currently involve Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei Darus-
salam;18 however, a parallel plan is currently being negotiated with 
Mexico.19 
This article will address Mexican farmworkers’ current lack of 
labor rights through a comparative analysis of the mechanisms, in 
the form of trade agreements, purportedly in place to counteract 
these issues. Part II of this article will explain how the workers fall 
into this exploitation and will address their grievances. Part III will 
analyze the relevant existing international law, including interna-
tional human rights law, labor law, and global trade law. This sec-
tion will also briefly address the dispute resolution mechanisms in 
place within the current agreements in order to provide a back-
ground on how they compare to the mechanisms within the TPP. 
Part IV of this piece will thoroughly analyze the effect of trade lib-
eralization, in the form of NAFTA and the TPP, on the rights of 
Mexican farmworkers and the enforcement mechanisms in place to 
ensure that the workers’ rights are protected. Finally, Part V will 
address recommendations for future improvement of these working 
conditions as well as the third-party mechanisms available to en-
force abidance with basic labor rights. 
                                                                                                             
 15 Id. at art. 19.3(2). 
 16 See generally Trans-Pacific Partnership art.28, available at https://www.m
fat.govt.nz/assets/_securedfiles/Trans-Pacific-Partnership/Text/28.-Dispute-Set-
tlement-Chapter.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2017). 
 17 Summary of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, OAS (Oct. 5, 2015), http://ww
w.sice.oas.org/TPD/TPP/Negotiations/Summary_TPP_October_2015_e.pdf. 
 18 Id. 
 19 The Trans-Pacific Partnership, TPP MADE IN AMERICA, https://ustr.gov/s
ites/default/files/TPP-Protecting-Workers-Fact-Sheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 
2017). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. Falling Into the Trap: How and Why Laborers Begin 
Working on the Farms 
As of 2012, there were almost 168 million children involved in 
child labor20 and 20.9 million persons involved in forced labor.21 
Additionally, in 2014, more than 59 types of agricultural goods 
(fruits and vegetables) were produced by child labor, meaning pro-
duced by children under the age of 15.22 Furthermore, over 27 types 
of agricultural goods were also produced using forced labor.23 In 
Mexico specifically, foods such as chili peppers, cucumbers, egg-
plants, green beans, and tomatoes have been identified as having 
been produced using child or forced labor.24 While exact percent-
ages of goods produced using these types of labor are not available, 
the United States Department of Labor stated that these findings re-
flected “significant incidences of child labor or forced labor” occur-
ring worldwide.25 
Approximately 14.3 percent of Mexico’s population (an esti-
mated 17 million individuals) is employed in agriculture.26 Of those 
17 million individuals, three million engage in internal migrant farm 
work.27 These workers leave impoverished communities in indige-
nous Mexican states, such as Oaxaca, Hidalgo, and Veracruz, to 
seek an escape from poverty.28 The workers are enticed to join labor 
                                                                                                             
 20 LIST OF GOODS PRODUCED BY CHILD LABOR OR FORCED LABOR, supra 
note 7, at 1. 
 21 Questions and Answers on Forced Labour, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR 
ORGANIZATION (June 1, 2012), http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/news-
room/news/WCMS_181922/lang--en/index.htm. 
 22 LIST OF GOODS PRODUCED BY CHILD LABOR OR FORCED LABOR, supra 
note 7, at 6. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. at 5. 
 25 Id. at 20. 
 26 Mexico: National Socio-Demographic Profile, ECONOMIC COMM’N OF 
LATIN AMERICA & THE CARIBBEAN, (2017), http://interwp.cepal.org/cepalstat/P
erfil_Nacional_Social.html?pais=MEX&idioma=english. 
 27 Human Rights of Migrants and Other Persons in the Context of Human 
Mobility in Mexico, INTER-AM. COMM’N H.R., Report No. 48/13, OEA/Ser.L/V/II 
¶ 69, (Dec. 30, 2013), http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/migrants/docs/pdf/Report-Mi-
grants-Mexico-2013.pdf. [hereinafter Human Rights of Migrants Report] 
 28 Id. 
104 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:3 
 
camps through endless advertisements, blaring through storefront 
speakers, portraying favorable conditions such as three free meals 
and 100 pesos per day, as well as a solid roof over their head.29 Des-
perate to improve their current conditions, men, women, and chil-
dren gather outside and meet with a labor contractor, who transports 
them to the farms where they will live for the next few months.30 In 
addition to the three million workers who have already internally 
migrated to labor on farms, it is estimated that approximately 
150,00031 new, hopeful workers make this dangerous trip32 every 
harvest season, traveling by bus, train, or even walking.33 Once they 
arrive at the farms, the workers quickly realize that surviving the 
treacherous journey was just the beginning. 
In Mexico, farms using these exploitative forms of labor export 
their products to major American brands, such as Whole Foods and 
Wal-Mart.34 For instance, the farm Agricola San Emilio, in Sinaloa, 
exports to Andrew & Williamson, an American distribution com-
pany located in San Diego.35 The distribution company then pro-
vides tomatoes to Darden Restaurants, the owner of popular restau-
rants such as Olive Garden and Longhorn Steakhouse, and to Wal-
Mart.36 Workers at the Agricola San Emilio farm are awoken every 
day at 3 a.m. to begin their work. They grab coffee, a biscuit, and a 
few tortillas and head to the fields.37 They receive two other small 
meals per day: a bowl of soup for lunch and another bowl for din-
ner.38 At 9 p.m., the workers retreat to their shacks to sleep.39 The 
next morning, the routine begins again. 
                                                                                                             
 29 Hardship on Mexico’s Farms, supra note 1. 
 30 Hardship on Mexico’s Farms, supra note 1. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Human Rights of Migrants Report, supra note 27 ¶ 89 (“The trip via the 
freight train through Mexico is so dangerous that migrants . . . commonly refer to 
it as ‘La Bestia’ or ‘The Death Train,’ because of the danger of falling from or 
being run over by the train.”). 
 33 Hardship on Mexico’s Farms, supra note 1 (“Earlier this year, 25 farm-
workers walked 20 miles across a Baja California desert after a contractor left 
them on the roadside, short of their destination.”). 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Hardship on Mexico’s Farms, supra note 1. 
 39 Id. 
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B. Life on the Farm40 
The difference between treatments of produce versus the treat-
ments of workers on the farm is unmistakable. In order to ensure the 
best harvest, farms conduct mandatory classes on proper picking and 
require workers to keep their hands sanitized and fingernails 
trimmed.41 The workers doing this work leave their families and 
homes to live in shed-like rooms with concrete floors.42 They typi-
cally have no beds or other furniture and resort to sleeping on pieces 
of cardboard.43 The workers in the camps share these rooms with 
four to six strangers, using tarps as partitions.44 The quarters are of-
ten rat infested, and mothers must construct makeshift cribs out of 
netting to protect their babies from scorpions.45 Women face the risk 
of sexual assault or violence on a daily basis.46 Children work long 
hours picking crops, such as short pepper plants, which are “per-
fectly suited to child pickers.”47 If the workers try to leave the camp, 
they may be captured and beaten by the bosses or threatened with 
death.48 
Furthermore, wages are significantly less than required by Mex-
ican federal labor law.49 Sometimes they are paid in the form of 
vouchers redeemable only at the company store.50 The wage of 100 
                                                                                                             
 40 To be clear, it would be presumptive to claim that these conditions persist 
at every farm in Mexico. However, 15 out of 30 mega-farms surveyed in a recent 
investigation were shown to use forced labor, while hundreds of small to mid-size 
farms were shown to use child labor. See Hardship on Mexico’s Farms, supra 
note 1; see also In Mexico’s Fields, supra note 3. 
 41 Hardship on Mexico’s Farms, supra note 1. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 See In Mexico’s Fields, supra note 3. 
 46 Human Rights of Migrants Report, supra note 27, ¶¶ 209-1090. 
 47 In Mexico’s Fields, supra note 3. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Salarios Mínimos Generales Por Área Geográfica, SECRETARÍA DEL 
TRABAJO Y PREVISIÓN SOCIAL, http://www.conasami.gob.mx/pdf/salario_min-
imo/2016/salarios_area_geo_2016.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2017). 
 50 Greg Asbed, Massive Mexican Slavery Operation Underscores Need for 
Market Consequences for Human Rights Violations, HUFFINGTON POST (July 1, 
2013), www.huffingtonpost.com/greg-asbed/massive-mexican-slavery-o_b_352
8340.html. 
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pesos a day that the labor contractor promised the workers is re-
vealed to be obtainable only if certain quotas are met.51 For the el-
derly or young, these quotas are often impossible to meet.52 Addi-
tionally, when the harvesting season nears its end, workers at every 
age struggle to make a decent wage.53 Wages are often illegally 
withheld until the end of the farmworker’s contract in order to en-
sure that he or she does not leave without the entire crop field being 
harvested.54 Without any money, the worker is often left indebted to 
the farm’s store, which is usually the only place where they can pur-
chase necessities such as water, toilet paper, and food.55 Because the 
farm storeowners do not place price tags on any products, the store-
owners are free to decide the price of the item, sometimes charging 
double of what the stores in town charge.56 
III. SUMMARY OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 
AND ORGANIZATIONS AFFECTING LABOR RIGHTS 
In order to best understand the impact of the Trans-Pacific Part-
nership on the labor and human rights sector, it is necessary to first 
analyze the existing law in these fields. Overall, the present treaties 
and laws have been largely unhelpful to promote labor and human 
rights in impoverished countries, such as Mexico, as a result of lack 
of enforcement mechanisms. This section will analyze the current 
international human rights laws, international labor laws, and then 
the existing global trade law in order to obtain a background on the 
importance of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. 
                                                                                                             
 51 Richard Marosi, Desperate Workers on a Mexican Mega-Farm: “They 
Treated Us Like Slaves,” LOS ANGELES TIMES (Dec. 10, 2014), http://graphics.lat
imes.com/product-of-mexico-labor/. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Hardship on Mexico’s Farms, supra note 1. 
 55 See Richard Marosi, Company Stores Trap Mexican Farmworkers in a Cy-
cle of Debt, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Dec. 12, 2014), http://graphics.latimes.com/p
roduct-of-mexico-stores/. 
 56 Id. 
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A. International Human Rights Law 
Following World War II, the international community began to 
focus on upholding international human rights.57 In 1959, the Or-
ganization of American States (OAS) created the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) to be the monitoring body 
for human rights.58 The IACHR “is a principal and autonomous or-
gan of the Organization of American States (OAS) whose mission 
is to promote and protect human rights in the American hemi-
sphere.”59 The IACHR works to further these ideals by examining 
complaints or petitions regarding specific cases of human rights vi-
olations and then publishing reports on these cases.60 In addition, the 
IACHR conducts visits to countries to investigate human rights vi-
olation allegations and makes recommendations to OAS member-
states regarding measures they should take to better protect human 
rights.61 
Mexico is also party to a number of human rights conventions, 
such as the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, and International Convention on the Pro-
tection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families.62 However, human rights conventions largely rely on self-
reporting and generally lack enforcement mechanisms. For instance, 
under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, a ratifying party 
must agree to “make the principles and provisions of the convention 
widely known, by appropriate and active means.”63 This Convention 
                                                                                                             
 57 Yvonne M. Dutton, Commitment to International Human Rights Treaties: 
The Role of Enforcement Mechanisms, 34 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2012). 
 58 What is the IACHR?, INTER-AMERICAN COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, http
://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/what.asp (last visited Mar. 30, 2016). 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 See Ratification Status for Mexico, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS 
OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/Treaty
BodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=112&Lang=EN (last visited Mar. 8, 
2017). 
 63 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 42, Nov. 20, 
1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448. 
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also establishes a committee64 to which the parties will submit re-
ports on measures they have taken to ensure the agreement is 
adopted in their country.65 However, there is nothing in the provi-
sions of this Convention that addresses what occurs if the parties fail 
to report or fail to uphold the agreement’s standards. 
Additionally, in 1981, Mexico ratified the American Convention 
on Human Rights, which states that human rights include the rights 
to humane treatment66 and freedom from slavery.67 This agreement 
requires parties to adopt legislation necessary to uphold the agree-
ment’s provisions.68 The American Convention on Human Rights 
also established the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.69  The 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights consists of seven elected 
judges who have the power to rule that a country violated the Amer-
ican Convention on Human Rights.70 However, while the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights represents a promising instru-
ment, there are few to no mechanisms to ensure that parties are up-
holding the judgment.71 
Many human rights agreements simply reflect unfulfilled prom-
ises that countries make and often lack the requisite enforcement 
mechanisms to rectify violations of human rights. Part of the reason 
some countries ratify these treaties may be because they realize that 
the cost of committing is low and the consequences of noncompli-
ance are insignificant.72 Though some states may treat the minimal 
enforcement mechanisms as a credible threat, because of the multi-
tude of countries that do not, many human rights conventions fall 
short of their intended goals. 
                                                                                                             
 64 Id. at art. 43. 
 65 Id. at art. 44. 
 66 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights 
art. 5, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. 
 67 Id. at art. 6. 
 68 Id. at art. 2. 
 69 Id. at ch.VIII. 
 70 Id. at art. 52 
 71 Morse H. Tan, Upholding Human Rights in the Hemisphere: Casting Down 
Impunity Through the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 43 TEX. INT’L L.J. 
243, 282 (2008). 
 72 Dutton, supra note 57, at 5. 
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B. International Labor Law 
International Labor Organization (ILO) is at the forefront of 
workers’ rights. The ILO was founded in 1919 and seeks to give an 
equal voice to workers, to promote rights at work, and to enhance 
social protection.73 The ILO has founded a number of conventions 
since its inception, including the Abolition of Forced Labour Con-
vention74 and Workmen’s Compensation (Agriculture) Conven-
tion.75 Mexico ratified the former on June 1, 1959 and the latter on 
November 1, 1937.76 These conventions reiterate the ILO’s labor 
rights77 and include mechanisms for handling complaints against 
parties.78 However, like the human rights agreements, the ILO has 
no sanctioning power or any other mechanism for enforcing its 
standards.79 Instead, violations of ILO conventions may only be 
remedied through party-to-party dialogue, embarrassing publicity, 
or other forms of social responsibility and moral forces to persuade 
the party-violator to rectify the situation.80 
Much like human rights law, international labor laws lack suffi-
cient enforcement mechanisms to bind parties to the agreements. 
The ILO wholly relies on “the power of persistent persuasion and 
the mobilization of shame against governments that fail to live up to 
                                                                                                             
 73 About the ILO, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, http://www.
ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2015). 
 74 See International Labour Organization, Abolition of Forced Labor Conven-
tion 1957, Jan. 17, 1959, available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=10
00:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C105. 
 75 See International Labour Organization, Workmen’s Compensation (Agri-
culture) Convention, 1921, Feb. 26, 1923, available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/no
rmlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C012. 
 76 Ratifications for Mexico, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11200:0::NO:11200:P11200_CO
UNTRY_ID:102764 (last visited Nov. 16, 2015). 
 77 See generally International Labour Organization, Abolition of Forced La-
bor Convention 1957, Preamble, Jan. 17, 1959, available at http://www.ilo.org/d
yn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C105; see gener-
ally; International Labour Organization, Workmen’s Compensation (Agriculture) 
Convention, 1921, Preamble, Feb. 26, 1923, available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/
normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C012. 
 78 Applying and Promoting International Labour, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR 
ORGANIZATION, http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/applying-and-promoting-int
ernational-labour-standards/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2017). 
 79 Compa, supra note 8, at 160. 
 80 Id. 
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the obligations they have voluntarily undertaken.”81 Because of the 
ILO’s lack of sanctioning power, labor laws may be most effective 
when coupled with trade laws, as discussed below. 
C. Global Trade Law 
Global trade law provides regulations and customs for trade be-
tween countries. Historically, international trade agreements left out 
provisions governing labor rights or human rights.82 Thus, trade law 
and human rights or labor rights were in distinct spheres. Develop-
ing countries especially resisted linkage because of the comparative 
advantage that they have in cheap labor and production.83 
Currently, the World Trade Organization (WTO) is the only 
global international organization dealing with trade between na-
tions.84 The WTO’s formal institution was the result of an overhaul 
of an international agreement, the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), and was established on January 1, 1995.85 It is com-
posed of 164 country-members, including Mexico.86 The WTO is a 
negotiating forum and provides a place for member-governments to 
sort out trade disputes.87 
For purposes of this paper, the most relevant agreement within 
the WTO is the Agriculture Agreement.88 This agreement allows 
                                                                                                             
 81 James Mercury & Bryan Schwartz, Article, Creating the Free Trade Area 
of the Americas: Linking Labour, the Environment, and Human Rights to the 
FTAA, 1 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 37, 46 (2001) (citing J.M. Vogelson, 
American Bar Association Section of International Law and Practice Report the 
House of Delegates, 30 INT’L LAW 653, 660 (1996)). 
 82 Thomas Cottier & Alexandra Caplazi, Labour Standards and World Trade 
Law: Interfacing Legitimate Concerns 17, available at http://www.humanrights.
ch/upload/pdf/000303_cottier_caplazi.pdf (“It would seem that arguments against 
linking trade and social standards have prevailed so far.”). 
 83 Id. 
 84 What is the WTO? , WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, https://www.wto.
org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2015). 
 85 What is the World Trade Organization?, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2015). 
 86 Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, https://www.w
to.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2015). 
 87 What is the WTO?, supra note 84. 
 88 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, April 
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410. 
2017] INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW 111 
 
governments to support their agricultural economies while improv-
ing market access and export subsidies.89 The objective of the agree-
ment is to create a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading sys-
tem.90 To do so, the agreement requires a reduction of the volume 
of, and expenditures on, subsidized exports.91 Additionally, the 
agreement requires the countries to reduce trade-distorting domestic 
subsidies.92 Notably, however, the Agriculture Agreement does not 
offer any labor protections for agricultural workers. 
In the event of a dispute rising from the Agreement, a member-
government may file a complaint against another member-govern-
ment. Under the WTO’s dispute resolution procedures, which in-
clude the establishment of a tribunal-like panel, dispute resolutions 
should occur within one year and three months of the initial com-
plaint.93 However, no sanction or recommendation is binding upon 
the violating country.94 The only potential mechanism for enforce-
ment under the WTO is for the complaining country to raise import 
duties (“within certain limits”),95 which can only be done after WTO 
authorization and only for a “reasonable period of time.”96 Addition-
ally, because the WTO addresses trade issues rather than labor, this 
loose enforcement mechanism cannot be applied to violations of any 
labor law or international labor agreement. 
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IV. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF NAFTA AND THE 
TPP 
A. The North American Free Trade Agreement 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a tri-
lateral agreement between the United States, Mexico, and Canada.97 
These three countries negotiated this agreement in an effort to im-
prove free trade by eliminating barriers to trade and promoting con-
ditions of fair competition.98 For the United States, the impetus for 
NAFTA began in 1984 after the passing of the Trade and Tariff Act 
under President Ronald Reagan.99 This Act grants the President the 
power to negotiate free trade agreements.100 It also restricts Con-
gress’ power to change negotiating points in agreements and instead 
only permits final congressional approval or disapproval.101 Five 
years after the Trade and Tariff Act was passed, the United States 
and Canada entered into the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,102 
which was the first agreement in North America to establish free 
trade between two nations through the “elimination of barriers to 
trade in goods and services.”103 Four years after entering into this 
agreement, however, NAFTA effectively suspended the Canadian 
agreement.104 President George H.W. Bush, Mexican President Car-
los Salinas de Gortari, and Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney 
signed NAFTA on December 17, 1992 and it entered into force on 
January 1, 1994.105 Trade among the NAFTA countries has tripled 
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since the agreement’s signing106 and has thus substantially expanded 
Mexican trade.107 However, the trade agreement itself, as almost all 
trade agreements at this time did, failed to provide provisions that 
would protect labor rights. Instead, labor rights are addressed in the 
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), a cor-
ollary to NAFTA.108 
a. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation 
The NAALC was proposed by the United States109 in order to 
substantiate NAFTA’s initial goal to “protect, enhance and enforce 
basic workers’ rights.”110 Public attention concerning the lack of la-
bor provisions in NAFTA materialized during the campaign of Pres-
ident Bill Clinton, who agreed to go further with NAFTA only if 
parallel accords on labor rights were negotiated with Mexico and 
Canada.111 The negotiations for the NAALC began on March 17, 
1993 in Washington D.C.112 Interestingly, during these negotiations, 
Mexico adamantly refused to classify labor standards as “obliga-
tions” and proposed that they instead be considered “objectives.”113 
This was because Mexican leaders believed that a country should 
not be required to “harmonize their labor standards to [sic] those of 
another country.”114 Though this could have been a warning to the 
United States and Canada that Mexico was not prepared to uphold 
labor rights, after about five more months of negotiations, the three 
countries signed the agreement on September 14, 1993115 and it en-
tered into force on January 1, 1994.116 
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The NAALC, as a labor side-agreement, was the first of its 
kind.117 The purpose of the NAALC is to “improve working condi-
tions and living standards in each Party’s territory.”118 However, this 
general goal did not include specifications as to how to meet it. For 
instance, the NAALC did not set a minimum wage by which the 
parties had to abide. Instead, it broadly provided that “each Party 
shall ensure that its labor laws and regulations provide for high labor 
standards”119 and that “[e]ach Party shall promote compliance 
with . . . its labor law.”120 This broad requirement provided little 
guidance as to what a country needed to do in order to abide by the 
NAALC. Another goal of the NAALC is to “promote, to the maxi-
mum extent possible, the labor principles set out in Annex 1.”121 
Annex 1’s guiding labor principles consist of: 
1. Freedom of association and protection of the 
right to organize 
2. The right to bargain collectively 
3. The right to strike 
4. Prohibition of forced labor 
5. Labor protections for children and young per-
sons 
6. Minimum employment standards 
7. Elimination of employment discrimination 
8. Equal pay for women and men 
9. Prevention of occupational injuries and ill-
nesses 
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10. Compensation in cases of occupational inju-
ries and illnesses 
11. Protection of migrant workers122 
In order to ensure that these labor principles are promoted, the 
parties agreed to each establish a National Administrative Office 
(NAO) that would serve as a point of contact between the national 
governments.123 Each NAO is charged with bringing labor com-
plaints to the NAALC’s Commission on Labor Cooperation and has 
the duty to review the labor laws in each country to evaluate whether 
a party has failed to comply with its obligations under the 
NAALC.124 
b. Dispute Resolution under the NAALC 
Dispute resolution under the NAALC is extremely complex and 
burdensome, mostly because of the Agreement’s complicated cate-
gorization of the above eleven labor principles.125 The NAALC di-
vides the principles into three groups: (1) Principles 1, 2, and 3; 126  
(2) Principles 4, 7, 8, 10, and 11;127 and (3) Principles 5, 6, and 9. 128 
Out of the three groups, this paper will only address Groups 2 and 
3. Specifically, when comparing the NAALC to the TPP, this paper 
will cover violations of the prohibition of forced labor, labor protec-
tions of children and young persons, and minimum employment 
standards, as these issues represent the largest reported problems oc-
curring on Mexican farms. Under all three groups, however, in the 
event of an alleged violation, the NAALC allows parties to talk with 
one another and to “establish consensual work programs to address 
the problem.” 129 
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Beyond these permitted discussions, the NAALC treats alleged 
violations differently based on which group the violation falls under.  
For instance, a violation of a principle in Group 1 is not subjected to 
an independent review procedure. 130 Thus, if the United States 
wanted to bring a claim against Mexico for violating workers’ right 
to collectively bargain, the United States’ only option to address this 
grievance would be to establish discussions and possible work pro-
grams with Mexico in order to resolve the dispute. On the other 
hand, the NAALC gives alleging parties more options to address a 
violation of a principle in Group 2. In the event of a violation of any 
of the principles in this group, the NAALC permits a grievance to 
go to an Evaluation Committee of Experts,131 further discussed be-
low. Finally, the NAALC allows the most intervention for an alle-
gation of a violation of any of the principles in Group 3. Under this 
group, alleging parties are able to initiate discussions, to take their 
grievance to an Evaluation Committee of Experts, or to bring the 
complaint to an arbitral panel.132 If a violation of a principle in 
Group 3 is found, the violating party may also face sanctions.133 
However, violations of principles in Groups 1 and 2 are not sub-
jected to these sanctions and countries are not permitted to bring the 
complaint to an arbitral panel. 
c. Post-Consultation Dispute Resolution for Groups 2 and 3 
If a dispute is not resolved through the initial permitted consul-
tations discussed above, a party may then request the establishment 
of an Evaluation Committee of Experts (ECE).134 The ECE is com-
prised of three individuals with expertise in labor matters and who 
are prohibited from taking instructions from any party.135 Within 
120 days after it is established, the ECE must present a draft report 
of the dispute.136 This report contains an assessment of the dispute, 
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the ECE’s conclusions, and practical recommendations when appro-
priate.137 Then, 60 days after this draft report, the ECE must present 
a final report to the NAALC’s Commission on Labor Coopera-
tion.138 Importantly, the ECE can only conduct assessments and in-
vestigations of the issues and make recommendations. None of these 
recommendations are binding on a party. 
After the ECE process, if the dispute involves a violation of any 
of the principles listed in Group 3, a Party may request another con-
sultation with the other Party, but only if there “has been a persistent 
pattern of failure by that other Party to effectively enforce such 
standards.”139 Within 60 days of this request, if the Parties fail to 
resolve the issue, a Party may then request a special session with the 
Commission on Labor Cooperation, which will seek advice from 
technical advisors and then attempt to mediate and make recommen-
dations.140 
If this third attempt of reconciliation does not resolve the issue 
within 60 days, the Commission on Labor Cooperation may then 
establish an arbitral panel (“the Panel”) after a two-thirds vote of the 
Parties.141 The Panel is to consist of 45 willing individuals who have 
expertise in labor law, dispute resolution under international agree-
ments, or other relevant professional experience.142 Within 180 days 
after the last panelist is selected,143 the Panel must present findings 
of fact and its determination as to whether there has been a persistent 
pattern of failure to the disputing parties, with a final report being 
presented within 60 days of the initial report.144 If the complained-
against Party fails to implement the plan presented by the Panel, the 
panel may impose a fine.145 If the Party further fails to pay this as-
sessment, the Panel may suspend the Party’s NAFTA benefits, but 
only “in order to collect what is necessary to pay the assessment.”146 
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This lengthy and complicated process allows about 1225 days from 
the initial complaint to a formal sanction for noncompliance.147 
Though nongovernmental actors (NGOs) are permitted to bring 
a complaint to a government, the NAALC leaves the government 
with the sole right to raise the complaint internationally.148 Notably, 
no complaint filed through the NAALC has advanced beyond the 
initial consultation level.149 Though the NAALC requires that do-
mestic labor laws be enforced, Mexico maintains a “hands-off” ap-
proach to enforcement of these laws.150 Additionally, there has been 
little effort on the part of the United States and Canada to verify 
accusations of lack of enforcement.151 Of the three cases that were 
brought under the NAALC against Mexico, not one went further 
than the Ministerial Consultation stages and the government parties 
simply established reach-out programs to “resolve” the issues.152 
Though the agreement was unprecedented in terms of a trade 
agreement with labor provisions, the NAALC has largely failed in 
its goal to protect labor rights. There are a few possible reasons for 
this failure. One reason could be that the dispute resolution proce-
dures are so lengthy and complicated that would-be complaining 
parties simply do not have the time or patience to figure out the sys-
tem and keep the complaint alive. Another possibility is that the 
United States and Canada have turned a blind eye to Mexico’s vio-
lations in fear of retaliation or political discourse between the coun-
tries. Third, the NAALC may fall short simply because reports of 
violations fail to thoroughly address the issues and do not provide 
enough information to justify an assessment of sanctions against a 
country. Finally, and perhaps the most pessimistically, the NAALC 
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may have failed because the United States and Canada simply re-
frain from bringing complaints because they have feel that they have 
nothing to gain from enforcing the labor rights of Mexican workers. 
B. Trans-Pacific Partnership 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a recently negotiated 
treaty that aims to improve international trade between the United 
States and eleven other Pacific Rim nations, including Mexico.153 
Though newly elected U.S. President Trump withdrew from the 
treaty, the remaining countries have continued discussions.154 The 
TPP’s thirty chapters address state-owned enterprises, intellectual 
property protection, environmental protection, and protection of la-
bor rights.155 In terms of labor rights, the TPP’s purpose is to protect 
workers and to promote transparency in negotiations between coun-
tries.156 
The precursor to the TPP was a 2002 tripartite agreement be-
tween New Zealand, Chile, and Singapore and later joined by Brunei 
Darussalam in 2005.157 In February 2008, the United States joined 
the negotiations in order to improve trade relationships with Pacific 
Rim countries.158 Seven countries were later invited: Australia, 
Peru, and Vietnam in 2008, Malaysia in 2010, Canada and Mexico 
in 2012, and finally Japan in 2013.159 Notably excluded from the 
negotiations was China, though the country remains a leader in in-
ternational trade.160 
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The TPP aims to protect labor rights, while improving working 
conditions, and to strengthen cooperation between the Parties on la-
bor issues.161 Article 19 of the TPP requires all Parties to adopt and 
maintain the fundamental labor rights as recognized by the ILO. 162 
Article 19.3 states that these labor rights consist of: 
(a) Freedom of association and the effective recogni-
tion of the right to collective bargaining; 
(b)The elimination of all forms of forced or compul-
sory labour; 
(c)The effective abolition of child labour, a prohibi-
tion on the worst forms of child labour and other la-
bour protections for children and minors; 
(d)The elimination of discrimination in respect of 
employment and occupation; and 
(e)Acceptable conditions of work with respect to 
minimum wages, hours, of work, and occupational 
safety and health.163 
Not only must Parties adopt and maintain laws in order to ensure 
that these rights are protected,164 they must also promote public 
awareness of their labor laws and compliance procedures. 165 Fur-
thermore, Parties are forbidden from weakening protections given 
in each Party’s labor laws in order to encourage trade.166 To hold 
Parties accountable, the TPP also requires other Parties to discour-
age the importation of goods from sources using forced or compul-
sory labor.167 
While the TPP, like NAFTA, only allows claims to be brought 
by countries, it does require each country to ensure that individuals 
have the ability to address their grievances within their respective 
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countries. Article 19.8 requires each Party to allow an individual 
with standing to have access to an “impartial and independent tribu-
nal for the enforcement of the Party’s labour laws.”168 These pro-
ceedings must be fair, adhere to due process, and give access to rem-
edies in the event that they are needed.169 However, these proceed-
ings only affect a country’s labor rights and not their obligations to 
the other party-countries of the TPP. 
To monitor whether labor rights are being upheld within each 
country, the TPP established a Labour Council.170 The Labour 
Council is composed of senior government officials, chosen by each 
Party, and is required to meet every two years.171 The Labour Coun-
cil’s duties involve discussing issues of mutual interest, facilitating 
public participation and awareness of the implementation of Chapter 
19, and overseeing the general work program.172 The Labour Coun-
cil is also required to work with what the TPP established as “Con-
tact Points” of each country.173 These Contact Points are offices or 
individual officials, designated by each Party, who facilitate com-
munication between the Parties and assist and report to the Labour 
Council.174 The Contact Points also act as a means for communica-
tion with their respective country’s public and have the power to 
“develop and implement specific cooperative activities bilaterally or 
plurilaterally.”175 
a. Dispute Resolution under the TPP 
As with the NAALC, cooperation between the TPP Parties is 
necessary to implement and enforce labor standards.176 Addition-
ally, like the initial dispute resolution mechanisms in the NAALC, 
Parties may deliver a written request to the other Party’s Contact 
Point in order to initiate discussions concerning an alleged viola-
tion.177 If the issue is resolved during these discussions, the Parties 
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document the outcome and make a report of it available to the pub-
lic.178 
However, if the issue fails to be resolved, the Parties are permit-
ted to engage in labor consultations.179 It is unclear exactly how 
these consultations would differ from the initial discussions, other 
than the requirement that labor consultation procedure must follow 
a specific timeline and that other Parties are informed of these con-
sultations. To initiate a labor consultation, the requesting Party must 
include specific information that allows the responding Party to re-
ply, and then must distribute the labor consultation request to the 
other Parties’ Contact Points.180 The responding Party then must re-
ply no more than a week later and distribute its response to the other 
Contact Points.181 
Parties must begin labor consultations no later than 30 days after 
this response.182 In these consultations, the Parties must provide 
enough information to allow an examination of the issue in its en-
tirety.183 To accomplish this, either Party may request independent 
experts or may request the presence of the other Party’s government 
officials or agencies with expertise in the matter.184 After examining 
the issue, the Parties must “make every attempt to arrive at a mutu-
ally satisfactory resolution of the matter.”185 In the event that they 
do not resolve the issue through these formal consultations, the Par-
ties are able to turn to formal “Dispute Settlement,” given in Article 
28 of the TPP.186 However, the formal Dispute Settlement process 
is only available if the Parties were unable to resolve the issue within 
60 days after the date of receipt of the initial request.187 This is an 
interesting requirement because it seems as though a Party could 
simply procrastinate on the labor consultations in order to avoid go-
ing through a formal Dispute Settlement. 
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Regardless, under Dispute Settlement procedures, the complain-
ing-Party may request the creation of a panel, consisting of three 
people, in order to fully address the failed issue at hand.188 When 
this occurs, both Parties must appoint a panelist within 20 days and 
agree on an appointment for a panel chair within 35 days.189 These 
panelists must be objectively chosen, must be independent of any 
Party, must have expertise in the law or the resolution of disputes, 
and must comply with a laid out code of conduct.190 
The panel’s purpose is to objectively assess the matter and make 
findings and recommendations for the resolution of the dispute,191 
using past WTO reports as persuasive, but not binding, precedent.192 
The panel must hold an initial hearing, which must be available to 
the public, and file an initial report no later than 150 days after the 
final panelist is appointed.193 This report must include findings and 
determinations, as well as the reasoning thereof.194 No later than 30 
days after this initial report, the panel must present a final report to 
the Parties, which must be released to the public within 15 days after 
receiving the final report.195 
Finally, this final report must be implemented within a “reason-
able time,” which the TPP states is no later than 15 months from 
receipt of the final report, though the Parties may agree on a shorter 
or longer time depending on the circumstances.196 In the event that 
the responding Party fails to implement the terms of the final re-
port’s recommendations within 30 days, the complaining Party is 
authorized to use “trade retaliation” (suspension of benefits or pay-
ment of a monetary assessment).197 The suspension should entail the 
same subject matter that was in dispute, but may entail different sub-
ject matter in the event that the grievance is severe enough.198 How-
ever, though these foreign sanctions can be imposed, “nothing in the 
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Agreement can require the United States or other Parties to change 
a law or regulation” domestically.199 
C. Comparing NAALC and the TPP 
The Obama Administration argued that the TPP was a signifi-
cant improvement on NAFTA200 and agreed that, “[p]ast trade 
agreements haven’t always lived up to the hype.”201 Though the 
NAALC helped to bring attention to labor rights by being the first 
trade agreement to include labor provisions,202 it inevitably proved 
to be inefficient because of its lack of effective enforcement mech-
anisms.203 Another shortcoming of the NAALC is its over-reliance 
on governmental action.204 As discussed below, this does not seem 
to be completely alleviated by the TPP. In concluding this, it is nec-
essary to first analyze how the protections of labor rights differ un-
der each agreement, and whether the enforcement mechanisms of 
the TPP will be more successful in protecting those rights. 
a. Forced Labor and Child Labor 
Both Annex 1 of the NAALC205 and Article 19 of the TPP206 
prohibit forced labor. However, they differ as to their protections of 
child labor. The NAALC states that each party must have “labor 
protections” for children and young persons as one of the standard 
labor principles, which are simply “guiding principles” and do not 
“establish common minimum standards for their domestic laws.” 207 
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The TPP, on the other hand, provides for the abolition of child la-
bor,208 rather than simply child labor “protections.” The specific re-
quirement for parties to maintain regulations that effectively abolish 
child labor in the TPP, rather than simply stating that the country 
must protect against child labor as the NAALC does, helps to clarify 
the obligations of the signing parties. 
Additionally, in regard to forced labor and child labor, though 
the NAALC only requires countries to enforce their own existing 
labor laws,209 the TPP commits all parties involved to the ILO’s 
standards on labor and requires them to adopt laws in adherence to 
ILO’s fundamental labor rights.210 Furthermore, unlike the NAALC, 
the TPP specifically forbids weakening protections to drive down 
prices and therefore encourage trade amongst the countries.211 Fi-
nally, the TPP furthers these workers’ rights by requiring parties to 
commit to discourage importation of goods that are produced by 
forced labor or child labor.212 This requirement holds all parties ac-
countable in eliminating child or forced labor. 
b. Minimum Employment Standards 
Both Annex 1 of the NAALC213 and Article 19 of the TPP214 
protect minimum employment standards for workers, including 
minimum wage and overtime pay. However, only the TPP requires 
the parties to establish regulations concerning hours of work,215 
while the NAALC simply leaves those standards to be bargained for 
under the protection of the labor principle of the right of workers to 
bargain collectively.216 This important difference places responsibil-
ity on the party, rather than placing the burden on workers to fight 
for minimum standards, because it requires the party to adopt new 
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regulations in the event that those minimum standards are not being 
effectively enforced. This is important because, though Mexico al-
ready has laws in place that govern these issues, the system is in dire 
need of reform or at the very least, implementation. To combat this, 
the United States’ commentary to the TPP stated that Mexico’s plan 
to implement a new system is forthcoming, an agreement that is dis-
cussed further below.217 This commitment to address already-pre-
sent issues is wholly absent from the NAALC. 
c. Dispute Resolution 
The clarity of the TPP’s dispute resolution mechanisms likewise 
improves upon the NAALC’s provisions. While the NAALC pro-
vides complicated tiers and different procedures to bring a dispute 
under each tier,218 the TPP provides the same mechanisms to resolve 
any labor dispute under Article 19.219 As discussed above, dispute 
resolution must be completed within 37 days of an initial com-
plaint220 or, if the parties choose to invoke Article 28, the process 
must be completed within 215 days.221 This timeline is a significant 
improvement on the 1225-day dispute resolution procedure that may 
occur under the NAALC timeline.222 
While the NAALC relies on country parties themselves to re-
solve a dispute,223 the TPP provides an independent tribunal, in the 
form of a panel, which is available if parties are unable to settle dis-
putes.224 This independent tribunal consists of three panelists who 
must have expertise in “law, international trade, other matters cov-
ered by this agreement, or the resolution of disputes arising under 
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international trade agreements.”225 The panelists must also be inde-
pendent of, and not affiliated with, any party, and chosen “strictly 
on the basis of objectivity, reliability, and sound judgment.”226 The 
existence of an objective third party to settle disputes is critical to 
ensuring that complaints are properly dealt with and that sanctions 
or recommendations further the purpose of the TPP.227 Under the 
NAALC, countries had little to no outside pressure to resolve dis-
putes and were dissuaded to enforce the Agreement lest the com-
plained-against Party filed a retaliatory action against the complain-
ing-Party.228 Under the TPP, however, many more countries are 
party to the agreement, and thus it is possible that there may there-
fore be more pressure amongst the parties to uphold the agreement.  
Additionally, the most noticeable difference between the TPP and 
the NAALC is that, under the TPP, countries may now enforce trade 
sanctions against one another in the event of a violation of the labor 
provisions. 
Finally, all written dialogues, labor consultations, and Panel de-
cisions must be made available to the public under the TPP.229 This 
allows interested members of the public to have access to records of 
how their country handles a dispute, or what, if any, action they take 
against a party in clear violation of the Agreement’s labor provi-
sions. This requirement furthers transparency and accountability, as 
public awareness places outside pressure on the Party.230 
D. Does One Agreement Supersede the Other? 
Because Mexico and the United States are parties to NAFTA 
and, assuming Mexico and the United States may be parties to the 
TPP or to a substantially similar agreement, it is imperative to ana-
lyze whether such an agreement will supersede NAFTA and thus the 
NAALC. If not, countries that are party to both treaties would be 
inclined to treaty shop depending on which agreement’s dispute 
mechanisms would result in a more favorable outcome. 
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The United States’ commentary to the Article specifically states 
that the TPP’s labor chapter will “broaden or improve upon 
NAFTA.”231 Article 1 of the TPP addresses concerns of overlapping 
agreements.232 The Agreement provides that, in the event of a dis-
crepancy between agreements, Parties must request consultations 
with another Party to discuss the inconsistency and attempt to reach 
a “mutual satisfactory solution.”233 This solution would likely be a 
mutual decision determining under which treaty the parties agree to 
seek dispute resolution. 
However, a footnote in Article 1.2 explicitly states, “[f]or pur-
poses of application of this Agreement, the Parties agree that the fact 
that an agreement provides more favourable treatment of . . . per-
sons than that provided for under this Agreement does not mean that 
there is an inconsistency within the meaning of paragraph 2.”234 This 
means that even if the TPP provides more stringent standards in 
terms of labor rights than NAFTA/NAALC, or another treaty that 
Mexico is party to, Mexico and a complaining-Party are under no 
obligation to discuss the inconsistency between the agreements and 
do not have to attempt to reach a mutual satisfactory solution. 
This issue is addressed later in the TPP Article 28. Under the 
TPP’s Choice of Forum provision, the Parties agree that in the event 
a dispute arises under both the TPP and under another international 
trade agreement (such as NAFTA), the complaining Party chooses 
which forum to use to settle the dispute.235 Additionally, the Article 
provides that once the complaining Party chooses the forum and 
once they have requested the establishment of a panel, “the forum 
selected shall be used to the exclusion of other fora.”236 Thus, while 
the TPP will not effectively supersede NAFTA or the NAALC, 
Mexico must still implement the labor standards outlined in the TPP 
and, if a dispute arises, a Party may choose TPP over NAFTA and 
the NAALC (or another agreement) to resolve the issue. Because the 
TPP has stricter labor standards, it is likely that a Party would choose 
the TPP over NAFTA. Additionally, the complainant-Party will 
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likely choose the TPP because of its stronger method of recourse to 
resolve the issue through more methodical dispute resolution proce-
dures. 
E. Will the TPP Effectuate Change? 
Trade agreements in the past have ultimately failed at protecting 
labor rights,237 and complaints relating to labor rights have rarely 
been filed.238 The main issue for Mexican farmworkers is that Mex-
ico does have rather strong labor laws, yet they have rarely been 
enforced.239 Article 123 of the 1917 Mexican Constitution contains 
a compilation of workers’ rights. 240  This Article was codified as 
federal law in 1931 and has been supplemented by an extensive la-
bor decree, the Mexican Federal Labor Law of 1970.241  Rights 
granted to workers through Article 123 include maximum work 
schedules of six eight-hour workdays per week for blue-collar work-
ers.242 Additionally, the Article establishes that the minimum age to 
work is sixteen-years-old.243 These provisions fit within the labor 
standards required by both the NAALC and the TPP. However, 
though the NAALC’s purpose was to help protect these rights, the 
Agreement was ineffective in fulfilling this goal—mostly as a result 
of its onerous enforcement provisions and its inability to impose ef-
fective sanctions.244 Between the NAALC’s entry into force, only 
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40 complaints have been filed between 1994 and 2015,245 with 24 
being directly filed against Mexico; however, no case has ever 
passed beyond Ministerial Consultations.246 Though the NAALC re-
quires Mexico to enforce its own labor laws, the requirement has 
failed to be effectively enforced, mostly due to lack of reporting on 
labor violations based on “the traditional weakness of Mexican un-
ions and the nature of the average Mexican worker.”247 Most Mexi-
can farmworkers have come from disadvantaged regions and are 
largely ignorant of their rights and the labor laws in the country.248 
Like the NAALC, the TPP’s labor provisions only allows for 
actions to be brought by Parties, meaning States. While this is typi-
cal for labor agreements, it is clearly not enough. As stated above, a 
glaring shortcoming of the NAALC was the over-reliance on gov-
ernmental action, which would also be the case for the TPP without 
an avenue for individuals or NGOs to bring claims. Frustratingly, 
while the TPP does not allow outside organizations to bring labor 
claims, it does allow outside organizations to bring intellectual prop-
erty claims. Under Article 18 of the TPP, investors are permitted to 
bring disputes under intellectual property rights. Companies and in-
vestors will be permitted to challenge regulations and government 
actions through a TPP claim—without any governmental interven-
tion to bring the suit.249 The question remains as to why investors 
have the option to bring a TPP claim, yet labor organizations, such 
as AFL-CIO, and farmworkers, are unable to. It seems as though 
investors get real relief, while workers must depend on the good 
graces of a government. 
To be sure, however, the signing of the TPP will not transform 
the nature of the average Mexican farmworker nor will they auto-
matically become informed of their labor rights and begin to demand 
them. Indeed, though these rights were loosely addressed through 
                                                                                                             
 245 Ebert, supra note 238, at 27. 
 246 Oliver, supra note 202, at 226 n. 236 (citing MARY JANE BOLLE, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., 97-861, NAFTA LABOR SIDE AGREEMENT: LESSONS FOR THE 
WORKER RIGHTS AND FAST-TRACK DEBATE 17 (Oct. 9, 2001). 
 247 Id. at 229. 
 248 Id. 
 249 FACT SHEET: Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), OFFICE OF THE 
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-of-
fices/press-office/fact-sheets/2015/march/investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds 
(last visited April 5, 2017). 
2017] INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW 131 
 
NAFTA, the number of children employed in child labor still had 
the slowest rate of decline in the Latin and Central American regions 
while NAFTA was in force.250 It is clear then that NAFTA fell short 
of its goal to eliminate child labor, though it should be noted that 
Mexico is but one country in the aforementioned region. However, 
the TPP does seem to improve upon the faulty framework of the 
NAALC and is, if nothing more, a step in the right direction for 
Mexican farmworkers. This is evidenced by the differing standards, 
accountability requirements, and enforcement procedures of the 
TPP. For instance, not only is Mexico required to maintain the ILO’s 
labor rights within its own laws, other Parties are now required to 
hold the country accountable if it fails to do so. Each Party to the 
TPP is required to discourage importation of goods from Mexico 
that are produced through forced labor or child labor, “through ini-
tiatives it considers appropriate.”251 It remains to be seen whether 
countries will do this at the expense of having to then import likely 
more expensive goods; however, the transparency provisions of the 
TPP may induce outside pressure from the Party’s constituents. Un-
der the TPP, Parties are now required to allow the public to submit 
grievances regarding labor rights.252 Once a Party receives such a 
submission, the Party must make the submission, and the results of 
its considerations, public.253 These transparency and accountability 
mechanisms do provide hope that Parties will uphold their respon-
sibilities and obligations under the TPP. 
Additionally, while sanctions for violating NAALC obligations 
have failed to be effective,254 the TPP’s ability to effectuate change 
through possible trade sanctions provides a more concrete method 
of enforcing TPP obligations. This ability of the TPP is unprece-
dented for Mexico in regard to labor rights and allows a direct hit on 
a violating country’s economy. 255 
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Finally, and perhaps the most promising, was the purported es-
tablishment of a bilateral implementation plan between the United 
States and Mexico to ensure labor reform and cooperation thereof.256 
As stated above, because U.S. President Trump withdrew from the 
TPP, the below bilateral plans serve as an example of how trade 
agreements could affect labor in regions that direly need a change. 
This implementation plan would have been subject to the same dis-
pute resolution mechanisms that the rest of the Agreement entails, 
including possible trade sanctions.257 Mexico’s plan was said to fol-
low the commitments that the United States had already made with 
Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei Darussalam. The already-negotiated 
plans with those countries included allowing independent unions 
and requiring the countries to enforce prohibitions on forced la-
bor.258 Essentially, the plans required these countries, which either 
lack labor laws or lack effective enforcement mechanisms, to imple-
ment or revise laws to rectify the issues. These changes were to have 
been made before the countries were allowed to export goods duty-
free to the United States.259 Additionally, the plans gave the United 
States the right to “withhold or suspend tariff reductions” for the 
country in the event that the country did not comply with the agree-
ment within five years.260 
Mexico’s plan was purported to reform “its system for protect-
ing collective bargaining and union representation rights.”261 Addi-
tionally, if Mexico’s plan followed that of the aforementioned coun-
tries, implementation of this plan will enable the United States to 
monitor and report on the progress of Mexico’s reform and withhold 
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tariff reductions in the event that it was not successful.262 In regard 
to the current issues occurring on Mexican farms, the surveillance 
of the United States in ensuring that Mexico implements the provi-
sions of the TPP seemed to be promising. If the Mexican plan had 
modeled the Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei Darussalam plans, the 
Mexican government would have been required to enforce its exist-
ing laws on minimum working age requirements and maximum 
work schedules. Additionally, as discussed further below, the TPP, 
through this plan, would have given workers the protection they 
need to establish effective unions. This would give the workers a 
platform to shed light on the atrocities that they face on the farms. 
While these plans seemed promising, the question remains as to 
whether they would have been abided by and, if not, whether the 
United States would have done anything about it. Interestingly, the 
United States recently faced a similar issue in 2014. Stemming from 
an allegation that Guatemala failed to effectively enforce its own 
labor laws, on August 9, 2011, the United States requested the es-
tablishment of an arbitral panel under the Dominican Republic-Cen-
tral America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR).263 
The two countries agreed to suspend the implementation of the ar-
bitral panel pending negotiations of and implementation of an En-
forcement Plan (similar to the above-discussed plans).264 The plan 
was signed in April 2013.265 However, because Guatemala had still 
not met the requirements of the Enforcement Plan seventeen months 
later, the United States chose to proceed with the dispute settlement 
process.266 This case marked the first and only time the United States 
has brought a case against another country for a labor violation un-
der a free trade agreement.267 
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In sum, the problem does not rest with the TPP. The provisions 
of the Agreement are the strictest that Mexico has ever been party 
to and the dispute resolution mechanisms provide a more methodical 
and time-sensitive manner to address labor violations. However, the 
problem largely rests with party-countries that fail to enforce agree-
ments. While this problem will likely remain, the recent case against 
Guatemala provides hope that the United States is ready to begin 
enforcing provisions of their labor agreements. Hopefully then, un-
der the TPP, the United States or other party-countries will feel pre-
pared to enforce possible violations against Mexico. 
V. ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
While the TPP sets a higher bar for labor rights than other free 
trade agreements have, it is naïve to believe that the new agreement 
will completely resolve the outstanding labor issues occurring on 
Mexican farms. Though there is likely no end-all solution, utilizing 
a bottom-up approach would help generate outside pressure from 
consumers (the demand side of business), unions, and individual 
workers (the supply side of business) on the Mexican government 
and the farm-owners.268 A bottom-up approach utilizes education of 
workers and consumers to place pressure on the suppliers and gov-
ernment and could aid in enforcing Mexico’s new obligations under 
the TPP by holding the country accountable for its agreements. 
Generating Pressure from the “Supply Side” 
As previously explained, many, if not all, of the workers on 
Mexican farms come from impoverished regions and are largely un-
educated. Unfortunately, this leaves the enforcement of workers’ la-
bor rights in the hands on the farm-owners or the government. The 
farm-owners have little reason to ask their employees to work fewer 
hours (in order to meet the maximum hours worked law) or to in-
crease their employees’ wages (as doing so would decrease the 
amount of money going to the owner himself). Additionally, until 
the Mexican government agrees to an implementation plan with the 
United States under the TPP, it is unlikely that they will begin to 
enforce their labor laws because they have not done so previously. 
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Thus, in order to institute this bottom-up approach, it is imperative 
that the workers become educated and form unions and NGOs to 
push for their rights. 
This is not out of reach for Mexican farm workers. For instance, 
in June of 2015, a group of farmworkers organized a strike in Baja 
California that resulted in wage increases of up to 50% as well as 
the securing of government-required benefits.269 The strike, initiated 
in part by labor leaders who had experience with farm labor unions 
in the United States, lasted for about three months and caused about 
$80 million in losses to the industry.270 Though somewhat success-
ful, many workers remain frustrated with the system.271 Continuing 
to ensure that labor standards are upheld, and fighting for labor 
rights beyond minimum wage and benefits, will require further per-
sistence and determination on the part of the workers. 
As one example on the effectiveness of determination within 
worker education and unions, in the wake of a similar situation that 
the Baja California workers faced, a group of workers in Florida 
collectively formed a NGO, called the Coalition of Immokalee 
Workers (CIW) in 1993.272 At that time, wages of workers on Flor-
ida’s tomato fields were declining and forced labor was the norm.273 
After discussing what could be done to implement change, the work-
ers effectuated “three community-wide work stoppages with intense 
public pressure- including an unprecedented month-long hunger 
strike” by 1998.274 Notably, this organization was formed through 
the dedication of the workers themselves and had no intervention or 
help from the government or legal system in its inception.275 Addi-
tionally, as a result of this pressure on Florida farm owners, the CIW 
secured raises of 13-25% across the industry and obtained political 
and social awareness and respect.276 As of 2015, the CIW has 
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worked with food giants such as Taco Bell, Burger King, and 
Chipotle, all of which have agreed to abide by the CIW’s standards, 
including “improv[ing] wages and working conditions for Florida 
tomato pickers in its supply chains.”277 
Additionally, the CIW has created the Fair Food Program, 
“which uses farmworkers’ legal rights as a baseline and then estab-
lishes crucial additional protections . . . .”278 Through this program, 
the CIW provides critical worker-to-worker education that educates 
farmworkers of their rights.279 The CIW also provides a 24-hour 
complaint line and complaint investigation and resolution process, 
giving the workers a protected way to file complaints before the is-
sue escalates.280 Additionally, under the Fair Food Program, farms 
are subjected to independent audits in order to ensure that the farms 
are complying with the Program’s standards.281 Finally, as further 
discussed below, the Fair Food Program is able to provide “enforce-
ment through market consequences,” holding the farm directly ac-
countable for their actions.282 
Ideally, new provisions in the TPP will help to provide these 
Mexican farmworkers with the ability to form these unions or 
NGOs. Notably, the purported main goal of the implementation plan 
was to develop reforms concerning its system for protecting collec-
tive bargaining and union representation rights.283 Additionally, the 
TPP requires countries to promote public awareness of its labor 
laws.284 Knowing that they have the capability to exercise their 
rights could give farmworkers the power they need to form a NGO. 
This NGO could mirror the CIW and further aid in implementing 
change across the farms. If the farmworkers were to model the CIW, 
as they seem to be beginning to do with the help of farmworkers 
previously working in the United States, there could be enough pres-
sure, by these NGOs, on the government to effectuate change. 
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A cross-border alliance would not be unprecedented. For in-
stance, in 1994, Mexico’s Authentic Labor Front and the United 
States-based United Electrical, Radio, and Machinist Workers 
(“UE”) joined forces to file a petition to the United States govern-
ment, in order to pressure the United States to file a claim against 
Mexico.285 While this petition was ultimately deemed insufficient to 
substantiate a claim that Mexico was violating NAFTA, it showed 
the power of NGOs to influence the government to initiate claims. 
These cross-border alliances are important, however, because Mex-
ican farmworkers cannot bring a claim against Mexico and because 
it is unlikely that they would be large enough or persuasive enough 
to pressure another country to bring a claim against Mexico. Similar 
to the UE petition, a cross-border alliance may have the scope and 
effectiveness to pressure a country, such as the United States, to file 
a claim against Mexico under the stricter TPP standards. 
Unfortunately, farmworkers would be starting on a much worse 
footing than the farmworkers who started CIW. While the CIW was 
established in response to wage and working hour issues, a Mexican 
NGO would be responding to repeat and egregious child labor, 
forced labor, and deplorable working conditions. Additionally, 
though they have been done before, cross-border alliances are an 
optimistic, and rather unlikely, hope for farmworkers because the 
workers are restricted to remaining in their camps when these viola-
tions are occurring. Realistically, Mexican laborers have many ob-
stacles to overcome before a farmworker NGO would be large 
enough and powerful enough to join with a United States NGO—let 
alone to effectuate change. However, if successful, this bottom-up 
approach on the supply-side leaves the Mexican government pres-
sured to protect its export economy and thus to respond to the labor 
violations—a huge step in the right direction for the protection of 
the workers’ rights. 
Generating Pressure from the “Demand Side” 
In order to support the farmworkers protesting on the supply-
side, consumers must continue demanding their food coming from 
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Mexico be ethically sourced—something that began to occur as a 
result of June’s strike.286 Consumer-driven enforcement mecha-
nisms demand socially responsible products and help to present “la-
bor rights as human rights.”287 A main element of the consumer-
driven model is the assumption that consumers will pay extra for 
decent working conditions.288 A survey conducted by the National 
Bureau of Economic Research found that consumers were willing to 
pay more for goods produced under decent working conditions and 
that they would require a steep discount in order to buy products 
produced in poor conditions.289 With enough consumer demand, 
producers have to would race to the top to compete with other com-
panies for public favor and consumer money.290 
Awareness of the exploitation of these workers should invoke 
strong reactions within consumers, and thus elicit strong demand, 
once they are educated on the horrific conditions occurring at the 
farms they purchase food from. This awareness would not spread by 
the TPP, but rather through exposés of the conditions, such as the 
aforementioned investigation conducted by Richard Marosi of the 
Los Angeles Times.291 This revolution will come slowly, but organ-
izations have already been formed in the United States with the aim 
of educating consumers on what exactly it takes to produce their 
produce. For instance, as described above, the Fair Food Program 
has promoted awareness of farm conditions across the United States. 
Similar organizations such as Fair Trade USA292 have been instru-
mental in educating consumers and workers alike about farmwork-
ers’ labor rights.293 As a third-party auditor of farms, Fair Trade 
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USA’s core values include ensuring a democratically run farm, fair 
working conditions (including a strict prohibition of forced and 
child labor), and sustainable wages.294 Once a product is approved 
by the organization, a sticker is placed on the product for consumers 
to see that it has met the program’s standards. This program utilizes 
consumer awareness and a demand-side approach to affecting the 
decisions on companies regarding where to purchase their goods 
from and strives to bring about “a social movement that brings 
strength, hope and real choice to the world’s consumers.”295 When-
ever a consumer purchases a product with a label such as this, the 
consumer is effectively using his buying power to “vote in favor of 
socially responsible production.”296 These third-party auditors are 
critical, because promises from companies and retailers to purchase 
products from ethical sources have largely fallen short without any 
third party watching over them.297 
The main issues with this approach are a possible lack of con-
sistency and a question of effectiveness.298 Because these labels and 
information systems are given by the private sector, it is often diffi-
cult for a consumer to know whether the information is based on 
independent evaluation or rather on a specific manufacturer’s sub-
jective claim.299 Additionally, the necessity of an individual evalua-
tion of each company wishing to be labeled as socially responsible 
is a costly endeavor for the evaluator. This requires both consumer 
awareness and consumer demand to remain high enough to prefer 
products produced under decent conditions to such a degree that the 
consumer remains willing to pay a higher cost for the product.300 In 
the event of a collapse of consumer demand for these ethically 
sourced goods, it would be necessary to reevaluate how to ensure 
that goods are being produced through socially responsible means. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The violations of labor rights occurring on Mexican farms, some 
of which export to American corporations, represent an egregious 
treatment of workers in a country that is party to numerous free 
trade, labor, and human rights agreements. The presence of forced 
labor, child labor, and utter lack of enforced minimum employment 
standards stands in clear violation of the ILO’s fundamental labor 
rights. Until the recent TPP, however, many of those agreements 
lacked provisions on labor rights and, when they did, they lacked 
sufficient enforcement mechanisms. These agreements therefore ul-
timately failed to protect workers. The newly negotiated TPP, on the 
other hand, binds Mexico to adhere to the fundamental labor rights 
outlined in the TPP. With the power of other parties to now enforce 
trade sanctions upon the country, it is likely that this agreement will 
effectuate at least part of the labor revolution that is so needed in 
Mexico. 
In regard to the labor provisions and dispute resolution mecha-
nisms stated in the TPP, the twelve countries established an unprec-
edented agreement that aims to protect vulnerable workers in all 
party-countries. While it remains to be seen whether the consulta-
tions and dispute resolution procedures will be used or will even 
work, the new agreement certainly reflects movement towards a 
more just treatment of Mexican farmworkers. Even if the TPP fails 
to be ratified in every country, the agreement sets a new precedent 
for future agreements to include fully enforceable labor provisions. 
Finally, outside pressure on governments is critical to ensuring 
that countries are fulfilling their commitments. Thus, implementing 
change will be most successful when mixing the TPP’s new guide-
lines with a bottom-up approach, from both workers and consumers, 
placing pressure on the Mexican government and food corporations 
alike. This worker-driven and consumer-driven enforcement, when 
paralleled with a free trade agreement that includes stronger labor 
protection such as the TPP, will result in an undeniable pressure 
upon the government and farm-owners to establish new protocols 
for dealing with labor rights in the country. 
